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The Increasing Relevance of Copyright
Statutory Damages: Some Brief
Digressions Upon Capitol Records v.
Thomas
Sherwin Siy*
The Thomas case 1 has brought two separate copyright
questions to the fore: the extent of the distribution right 2 and the
extent of statutory damages. From its inception and through the
declaration of a mistrial last year, the former question excited a
great deal of the copyright law blogosphere, and presents a few
interesting questions for debate; the latter has gained more
mainstream attention, 3 but did not initially raise as much of a
controversy within the confines of the case itself.
After all, more was at stake in the interpretation of “making
available,” since Judge Michael J. Davis chose to order a new trial
based on flawed jury instructions that equated “making available”
with the distribution right. 4 There are also interesting parallels
between the distribution right and the right of “making available”
as articulated in international agreements; there is the continuing
discussion of whether or how “distribution” is distinct from

A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexix/book4. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
* Deputy Legal Director and Kahle/Austin Promise Fellow, Public Knowledge.
1
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
2
17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
3
See, e.g., Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2007, at C1; Tony Long, Commentary: RIAA Hits a Sour Note With Its File-Sharing
Witch Hunt, WIRED, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/
theluddite/2007/10/luddite_1011; Nilay Patel, RIAA Wins First-ever File-sharing Case to
Go to Trial, Awarded $222,000, ENGADGET, Oct. 4, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/
2007/10/04/riaa-wins-first-ever-file-sharing-case-to-go-to-trial-awarded.
4
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226–27.
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“publication.” 5 On the other hand, the statutory damages assessed
to Jammie Thomas are high, certainly, but clearly within the
confines set by the statute.
In terms of effects on copyright policy, though, the question of
statutory damages will likely be of greater import than questions
about the making available right. The issues surrounding the
distribution right have had their greatest impact on the Thomas
case because of the particular strategy that the record labels have
used to find and sue file sharers—relying upon investigators to
locate copyrighted files that defendants are placing in open shared
folders without authorization. 6 Construing this as a distribution
allows litigation to proceed without need for any further evidence
beyond the location of the file in the shared folder, or without
debating whether or not the investigators’ own downloads
constitute a distribution by the sharer. 7
However, a less expansive definition of the distribution right
would not bar litigation: a fact-finder is certainly allowed to make
reasonable inferences at trial, and in a civil case where the burden
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, it should not be that
difficult to prove that a user offering up a shared file to thousands
of others seeking it would have distributed it at some point. Nor,
in most cases, should it be difficult to find that the user had made
an unauthorized reproduction of the copyrighted work at issue.
So while there are worthwhile legal controversies surrounding
the interpretation of distribution that have affected the Thomas
case and will certainly affect other areas of copyright controversy,
the end result of interpreting distribution one way or another will
likely have less practical impact in the long term. 8
5

See id. at 1219–20, 1225–26 (discussing interplay between “publication” and
“distribution” and the role of treaty language in the decision, respectively).
6
See id. at 1214–16.
7
The court in Thomas concluded that the investigator’s downloads would constitute a
distribution by Thomas. Id. at 1216. Even assuming distribution was defined more
narrowly, this would seem to encompass most unauthorized file sharers of copyrighted
works.
8
Indeed, a strategy of mass file sharing lawsuits may soon be rendered obsolete, as
many labels have found little effect on downloading trends and a large amount of bad
publicity resulting from them. See, e.g., Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to
Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B1. A large number of cases still
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However, the singular fact that first made mainstream
headlines in the Thomas case was the extent of statutory damages.
Thomas was initially found liable for a total sum of $222,000; a
matter of $9,250 for each of the twenty-four tracks Thomas
infringed. 9 After the retrial, a new jury awarded plaintiffs $1.92
million in damages, $80,000 per track infringed. 10 The significance
that the press and public afforded this fact is in line with the
significant role that large statutory damages play in a wide and
increasing range of copyright controversies in the digital age. As
such, a number of issues surrounding copyright statutory damages
could benefit from further research and greater scrutiny. 11
As headline-grabbing as even the first award was, it would not
necessarily have been news to those familiar with the statute.
Section 504 clearly allows such an award. 12 Without a showing of
actual damages, a plaintiff can be awarded a value between $750
and $30,000 per work infringed. 13 This range can be extended—
innocent infringers may pay out as little as $200 per work
infringed, whereas willful infringers face a range from $750 up to
$150,000. 14
Measured in terms of actual damages, Thomas’s infringement
could be valued at as little as $1 per track (the approximate retail
value on a download service like iTunes). Perhaps more
realistically, the damages could be adjusted upwards to account for
a number of other factors, including multiple potential sales lost
proceeding through litigation were apparently initiated before this decision was made.
See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Nothing to See Here: RIAA Lawsuits Continue, EPICENTER,
May 6, 2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/nothing-to-see-here-riaalawsuits-continue.
9
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213, 1227–28 (noting, even though beyond the scope
of the trial court’s review, the “unprecedented and oppressive” amount of damages).
10
See, e.g., David Kravets, Jury in RIAA Trial Slaps $2 Million Fine on Jammie
Thomas, THREAT LEVEL, Jun. 18, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/riaajury-slaps-2-million-fine-on-jammie-thomas.
11
One prominent and thorough study is a forthcoming paper by Pamela Samuelson
and Tara Wheatland released in the past year since the Symposium. Pamela Samuelson &
Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375604.
12
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
13
Id. § 504(c)(1).
14
Id. § 504(c)(1)–(2).
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from repeated distributions of the same track. The minimum that a
jury could have awarded in statutory damages, however, is $18,000
total.
Even leaving aside the simple immensity of this minimum, the
range of values available to a court in assigning damages
represents a extraordinary amount of discretion; a range that spans
over two orders of magnitude. In a case where thousands of works
may have been infringed, a court may then decide, in the absence
of any evidence of actual harm, whether damages should be
measured in millions or billions of dollars.
Both the size and the sizable range of copyright statutory
damages are an outlier compared to other provisions in the U.S.
Code. For instance, someone obtaining a consumer report
fraudulently or for unlawful purposes is liable for actual damages
or $1000, whichever is greater. 15 A federal agency that fails to
comply with the Privacy Act and thus creates an adverse harm to
an individual is liable to the individual for at least $1000. 16
Negligently or fraudulently preparing bankruptcy records can
result in damages of $2000 to a debtor, or twice the amount paid
by the debtor to the preparer. 17 Failing to comply with statutory
requirements in mortgage loan servicing results in actual damages,
plus a maximum additional $1000 in cases of a pattern or practice
of noncompliance. 18 In class actions under that same section,
damages beyond actual damages are capped at $1000 per class
member, with a maximum additional award equal to either
$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the defendant. 19
Those harmed by force, threats of force, or physical obstruction in
seeking access to or provision of reproductive health services may
sue for statutory damages which are capped at $5000 per
violation. 20 A plaintiff whose communications have been illegally
intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of the Wiretap Act 21

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(B) (2006).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 110(i)(1)(B) (2006).
12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1) (2006).
Id. § 2605(f)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1) (2006).
Id. §§ 2510–2522.
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can obtain the greater of actual damages or statutory damages in a
range of $50 to $500 for a first-time offense or $100 to $1000 for
repeat offenses, with a court able to increase the award to the
greater of $100 per day of a violation or $10,000. 22 Consumers
harmed by junk faxes or prohibited autodialing are entitled to
statutory damages of $500 or actual damages, whichever is
greater. 23
In this admittedly brief, unscientific survey of statutory
damages provisions, the amounts at issue in copyright
infringement do seem to occupy an extreme, especially considering
that these values can be leveled against defendants unquestionably
less sophisticated than the large and/or regulated entities
encompassed by some of the larger awards noted above. 24
Given this outlying position in the U.S. Code, it would be a fair
question to ask if the high values of these damages seem to be
performing a particularly effective job as a deterrent. The answer,
however, coming from two different sides of the copyright debate,
finds statutory damages ineffective in at least two ways.
Those who are most concerned that scofflaws be deterred may
note that in some cases, statutory damages may not be sufficient to
offset potential profits by large-scale infringers. 25 And at the other
end of the scale, there are other considerations: if low-value
infringements are not deterred by statutory damages several
hundred times their actual value, would damages thousands of
times greater have any appreciable additional deterrent effect? If

22

Id. § 2520(c)–(d).
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006).
24
See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn.
2008) (“The Court does not condone Thomas’s actions, but it would be a farce to say that
a single mother’s acts of using Kazaa are the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global
financial firms illegally infringing on copyrights in order to profit in the securities
market.”).
25
See, e.g., Sarah A. Zawada, Comment, “Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different
Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on the Deterrence Goal of Copyright
Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 129, 149–52 (2006) (noting that some infringers
may profit more from an infringement than statutory damages may cover). However, it
should be noted that plaintiffs can choose between actual and statutory damages at any
time. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
23
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heightened deterrence effects cannot justify the current size and
range of statutory damages, what does?
Doubtless, the range has increased since its inception. In 1976,
the range of copyright statutory damages was from $250 to
$10,000, with innocent infringement minimums of $100, and
willful set with a maximum of $50,000. 26 These values have,
through amendments in 1988 27 and in 1999 28 reached their current
values. 29 Even in the original text of the 1976 Act, however, the
range still encompassed the same large multiplier range, granting a
judge or jury incredible latitude in determining a statutorily-set
penalty.
Part of the reason for this range of discretion can be found in a
particular feature of the 1976 Act’s statutory damages regime.
According to § 504(c)(1), statutory damages are calculated
according to the number of works infringed, regardless of the
number of copies, distributions, or performances made in each
offense. 30 Whether a photograph is reproduced in a single piece of
artwork, or printed in a newspaper with circulation in the
thousands, only one award will be available within the statutory
range.
Nor is the scale or scope of the work infringed considered in
counting statutory damages. An infringement of a single sonnet is
subject to the same range of statutory damages as an infringement
of a 1400 page novel. 31 Given this lack of differentiation, a wide
range is necessary to account for all of the variations in culpability
that a single act of infringement can encompass.

26

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c), 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)).
27
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 10, 102 Stat.
2853, 2860 (doubling the minimum and maximum range).
28
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774 (increasing minimum and maximum range by fifty
percent).
29
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
30
Copyright Act of 1976 § 504(c)(1).
31
Although the statutes offer more explicit guidance in considering such factors when
deciding certain questions of liability, such as in fair use, those considerations are not
explicitly referenced for use as guidelines after infringement has been found.
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These features stand in contrast to the Copyright Act of 1909,
which contained an extremely complex statutory damages
provision. 32 Essentially, the 1909 Act provided for a basic range
32

Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 101(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (amended by
Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 101(b), 61 Stat. 652, 661 (1947)) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
101(b)), reprinted in CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 272 (7th ed. 2008)
[hereinafter Copyright Act of 1909]. In relevant part, this read:
[I]n lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court
shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may,
in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in case
of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such
damages shall not exceed the sum of $200 nor be less than the sum of
$50, and in the case of the infringement of an undramatized or
nondramatic work by means of motion pictures, where the infringer
shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that such
infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages
shall not exceed the sum of $100; and in the case of an infringement
of a copyrighted dramatic or dramatico-musical work by a maker of
motion pictures and his agencies for distribution thereof to exhibitors,
where such infringer shows that he was not aware that he was
infringing a copyrighted work, and that such infringements could not
reasonably have been foreseen, the entire sum of such damages
recoverable by the copyright proprietor from such infringing maker
and his agencies for the distribution to exhibitors of such infringing
motion picture shall not exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than
$250, and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of
$5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as
a penalty. But the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the
copyright proprietor of any other remedy given him under this law,
nor shall the limitation as to the amount of recovery apply to
infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant, either
by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon
him.
First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, $10 for every
infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the
infringer or his agents or employees;
Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title,
except a painting, statue, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy
made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his
agents or employees;
Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $50 for every
infringing delivery;
Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or
orchestral composition, $100 for the first and $50 for every
subsequent infringing performance; in the case of other musical
compositions $10 for every infringing performance.
Id.
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of between $250 and $5000, which could be adjusted upwards by a
court. 33 Significantly, though, the statute provides also particular
guidelines for certain specific infringements.
Within the slightly smaller range of the 1909 Act, each
infringing copy made would increase the amount of the statutory
damages, up to the maximum of $5,000. 34 The amount of the
multipliers would also depend upon the type of work infringed: for
paintings, statutes, and sculptures, $10 were assessed for each copy
made. 35 For lectures, sermons, or addresses, $50 were assessed for
each infringing delivery. 36 Infringing dramatic, orchestral, or
choral productions would result in $100 for the first infringing
performance and $50 for each performance subsequent; other
musical works would be liable for $10 per infringing
performance. 37 Other works would create liability at $1 per
infringing copy. 38
Though criticized (likely rightly) for its impenetrability, 39 the
statutory damages provision of the 1909 Act contained degrees of
guidance and subtlety that are absent from the current statute.
Within its mandated maximum and minimum range, courts had a
rough guide to account for the variations in the number of
infringing copies produced. Courts also had some statutory
guidance in dealing with particular types of infringers: newspapers
infringing a photograph could only be liable for $50 to $200;
certain innocent infringements made specifically in motion
pictures were capped at $100. 40
The variety and specificity of these provisions may have
complicated calculations, but their presence also created specific,
bright-line caps for particular types of infringers and
33

Id.
6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:154 (2007).
35
Copyright Act of 1909.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 34 (“Section 101(b) of the 1909 Act was one of the
many failures of that Act. In addition to confusion over whether statutory damages were
awardable under section 101(b) only when actual damages or defendant’s profits were
unascertainable, section 101(b) presented a baffling smorgasbord of provisions . . .”).
40
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 32.
34
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infringements.
Today’s statute provides no such guidance
alongside its range, which has increased both proportionately and
numerically.
If that wide range is meant to encompass a range of infringing
copies from one to up to thousands, as well as infringements of
large and small scale alike, perhaps a set of guidelines could be
crafted so that various instances of infringement could be
consistently, predictably, and fairly placed within that scale. In
addition to adjusting for easily quantifiable factors like the number
of copies produced, or the amount of work infringed, a court might
also be advised to account for the “depth” of the infringement—to
what extent the protectable, creative content embodied in the work
was at the heart of the value sought by the infringer. Such
guidelines need not be a mechanical formula that must be applied;
however, they could provide a useful benchmark, with additional
adjustments available at the fact finder’s discretion.
Accounting for such context-dependent factors would not be
new to copyright litigation—such open-ended considerations are
part and parcel of making decisions on liability, so they may well
have a place in the remedies phase as well. The contours of the
rights held by copyright owners and users are themselves highly
context-dependent, varying from situation to situation depending
upon the types of works, identities of the parties, and the particular
uses made of the works. 41
Allowing for some flexibility and discretion would seem to be
necessary—the current situation, in which statutory damages are
collapsed into three broad categories, may be a recognition of the
impossibility of accounting for all of the possible relevant factors.
Ultimately a decision will be based upon the facts of a particular
case—and a court would be the best determiner of how those facts
41

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 115 (2006). Each alter the basic rights held by
copyright holders depending upon context. Libraries, certain business establishment
owners, and sound recording artists are all specifically entitled to particular uses in
certain situations. See also Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on its Head? The
Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799,
1807–09 (2007) (“These bundles of entitlements vary greatly with context, depending on
the parties involved, their relationship, and the resource at issue. . . . [T]he Copyright Act
is the epitome of context-specific entitlements.”).
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should affect the penalties. Nonetheless, statutory guidance might
be particularly helpful in an area where a jury or judge is faced
with such a wealth of a range.
Such guidance might also have the role of clarifying the
purpose behind statutory damages, preventing not only troublingly
disproportionate awards, but also immunizing the provisions
against constitutional challenges. A lack of proportionality is at
the heart of a number of challenges to application of section 504,
rooted in the theory that the size and discretionary range of the
damages available deny a defendant of substantive due process, in
the same way that disproportionate punitive damages do. 42
Without taking a position on the merits of the constitutional
argument, it is worth noting that, at least for the Thomas jury, the
availability of higher statutory damages seemed to serve a punitive
purpose. 43 According to at least one juror, a reason for the size of
the damages was related to Thomas’s apparent lack of credibility
in her defense of mistaken identity. 44 A set of guidelines that
garnered a value attributable to specific aspects of findings of
infringement might be better insulated against constitutionality
challenges.
CONCLUSION
Much ado is being made of the “making available” question
because it affected the specific outcome of the Thomas and the
specific tactics that have been used—that have been easy to use—
by plaintiffs. No matter how it is decided, there are workarounds
for the types of stakeholders involved in the Thomas trial. Even if
distribution is construed as making available, sharers and software
developers can evade this particular avenue of enforcement by
42

See, e.g., Brief of Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaims, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 03-CV-11661-NG (D. Mass. Oct.
27, 2008) (originally docketed Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. 1:07-cv11446-NG); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against
Illegal File-Sharing: the Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages
for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004).
43
See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
44
See David Kravets, RIAA Juror: ‘We Wanted to Send a Message’, WIRED, Oct. 9,
2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w.html.
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altering their behavior (e.g., using closed networks, or physical
media “sneakernet” transfers). 45 And if distribution is held to
require actual transfer, plaintiffs could still have file sharers on the
hook for distributions to investigators, probable-by-apreponderance-of-evidence showing of actual distribution, or
infringement of reproduction rights.
On the other hand, statutory damages and their unpredictability
will be a factor not only in many file sharing cases, but every
single copyright infringement case in which a plaintiff does not
elect actual damages. Even beyond the impact upon litigation, the
chilling effects of a large negative outcome can pressure early
settlement before the merits can be decided at trial, whether the
defendant is a single file sharer, a large newspaper publisher, or a
cable company. A fresh look at the consequences of the available
range, and a more predictable and nuanced accounting of the
awarded values, could be valuable in ensuring that they serve their
intended purpose.

45

A sneakernet transfer describes the transfer of data from one machine to another by
physically moving a tape, disk, or some other removable media. Paul Boutin, Sneakernet
Redux: Walk Your Data, WIRED, Aug. 26, 2002, http://www.wired.com/culture/
lifestyle/news/2002/08/54739.

